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Abstract 
In a collaboration environment, it is a challenge how to effectively share the information needed for 
collaboration while protecting other confidential information in a product assembly model. In this paper, 
an innovative encryption approach for assembly models to support collaboration is presented. This 
approach is content based encryption and effective for the secure sharing of feature-based assembly 
models. In the approach, a classification algorithm for features in an assembly model to be shared or 
protected during collaboration has been first developed. An encryption algorithm for a feature has been 
then designed to ensure the parameterization, topological and geometrical validity, and self-adaptability 
of the encrypted feature. An algorithm for parts with multiple encryption features has been developed. 
Based on the above algorithms, parts are finally assembled and the geometry and topology of the 
assembling structure are kept un-changed to enhance collaborators’ interoperability. The characteristics 
and innovations of the approach include: 1) the approach is feature based, integrative into the main-stream 
commercial Computer Aided Design (CAD) systems, and flexible to meet various users’ needs for 
encrypting features selected by users during collaboration, 2) in the approach, the topological and 
geometrical validity of an assembly model after encryption is maintained to ensure effective collaboration 
on the assembly, and 3) the approach is parametrically controlled through adjusting position and size 
parameters so as to ensure the user friendliness of using the approach. A case study with complex 
geometries and assembly structures has been used to validate the effectiveness and robustness of the 
approach in industrial applications. 
Keywords: Assembly encryption, Assembly features, Encrypted features, Feature classification  
 1. Introduction 
Product development enterprises consider their product models as core intellectual properties [1, 2]. In 
order to support collaborative product development effectively, flexible encryption approaches on product 
models (e.g., Computer Aided Design (CAD) models) are imperative to ensure effective information 
sharing for collaboration as well as protection of other private information in the models [3, 4]. 
An assembly contains critical assembly structure information and the parts in it contain abundant design 
features, design procedure and feature parameters. However, the related security research on assemblies 
have focused on the part level. It is still far away from meeting industrial requirements [5]. To protect the 
assemblies as well as supporting the flexibly sharing and collaboration in a network based manufacturing 
environment, an innovative encryption approach for product assembly models is presented in this paper. 
The innovations of the approach include: 
(1) The approach is feature based and can be integrated to main-stream feature based CAD systems that 
have been widely used in industries. Through the feature based encryption mechanism for an assembly 
model, users’ needs of encrypting selected features will be met, and the assembly features and structure 
will be maintained to facilitate collaboration; 
(2) The approach is based on the geometrical deformation of features. By maintaining assembly features 
while deforming other selected features in an assembly model, the validity of the structure in the assembly 
model  is ensured while other features to be protected by geometrical deformation; 
(3) The approach is designed based on a parametrically controlled mechanism to enhance user 
friendliness. Geometrical deformation for encrypting features in an assembly model is controllable by 
users through adjusting position and size parameters defined in the parametric mechanism of the 
encryption approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related research work is surveyed. 
Section 3 introduces the details of the encryption approach for assembly models. A case study to validate 
the approach is given in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5. 
 2. Related Work 
In the past years, a number of related research projects have been conducted. The research can be 
classified as three categories [6] - (1) collaboration access control, (2) simplification of product models 
for collaboration, and (3) feature-based product model encryption. The related work are summarized 
below: 
Collaboration access control has been widely used for data security in a network environment. 
Mechanisms were designed to authorize users to access the shared data. In early times, generic access 
control methods were used for protecting product models during collaboration [7-11]. Later on, in 
consideration of the complexity of design data, some dedicated access control methods were developed, 
such as access control based CAD architecture [12], ADOSX system that can handle CPD (collaborative 
product development) between two enterprises by Stevens [13], a secure access control mechanism for 
3D models [14], a security approach for a distributed product data management system [15], etc.  
Moreover, taking account of the frequent sharing of design data, sharing space based access control 
methods were developed, in which a secure sharing space was designed [16-18]. Moreover, for further 
improving model security during collaboration, access control mechanisms were reinforced by 
introducing digital signature or watermark mechanisms for product model protection [19-22]. Generally 
speaking, although different access levels for the models can be defined, the protecting granularity is not 
small enough and the confidential information of every access level cannot be arranged flexibly by the 
model owner. As such, the developed methods on product models are still not flexible enough to support 
collaboration. 
In order to protect the private information of product models during collaboration, methods for 
simplification of product models (e.g., as different Level Of Details (LODs)) were developed. Cera 
proposed a LOD based access control method for CAD models [23, 24]. Chu developed a mechanism for 
sharing of LOD CAD models for product collaboration [25, 26]. Li proposed a matrix-based 
modularization approach for CAD models [27]. The above approaches are mainly aimed at part models. 
To support assembly based collaboration, some research work focus on the mechanism of simplifying 
assemblies. In the simplification process of assembly models, internal parts and features that are not 
 visible from outside are the first to be removed. Kanai and Yu detected invisible features by pre-rendering 
the models from multiple view directions [28, 29]. Han proposed an approach to automatically create a 
simplified assembly models with the desired LOD value [30, 31]. The simplification methods were mainly 
designed for the purpose of efficient model sharing via the Internet with limited bandwidth to support 
collaboration. The levels of details cannot be designated by the model owner. As such, users’ 
collaboration requirements on secure sharing of assemblies could not be addressed effectively. 
Encryption research was conducted to protect CAD models. Special encryption of for 3D models was 
proposed [32]. However, the developed encryption methods are not feature based, which are not easily 
integrated with the main-stream CAD systems used in industries and inflexible to operate during 
collaboration. 
The authors of this paper have actively developed related research in recent years. The feature based 
encryption methods developed by the authors have provided flexible mechanisms for users to select 
features for encryption, and the encryption process on features can be controlled by users in a parametric 
means [33, 34]. On the other hand, collaboration is usually carried out in an assembly level, while the 
related research conducted on the feature level has limited the effectiveness of the methods in applications. 
3. Encryption Approach for Assembly Models 
A collaboration application scenario for encrypting an assembly model is illustrated in Figure 1. For 
instance, there are two collaborators to work on an assembly model. Part 1 and Part 2 are designed by 
Collaborator 1 as a sub-assem_1, to be assembled with Part 3 designed by Collaborator 2 as an assembly 
model. During collaboration, assembly features and associate features are kept the same to indicate the 
assembly relationships while other features are encrypted for design information protection. 
  
Figure 1: The collaboration scenario for encrypting an assembly model. 
The encryption process of the approach is depicted in Figure 2. The approach is implemented through 
the following three algorithms: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The encryption process and algorithms of the approach 
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 the encryption of other features and the parts. A classification algorithm is developed for classifying 
assembly features, dependent features for the assembly and features for encryption. An Assembly 
Relationship Graph (ARG) and a Feature Dependent Graph (FDG) are developed to support the above 
process; 
(2) Encryption algorithm for features – The algorithm is based on an encryption transformation 
matrix, which is parametrically controlled by users, and adaptively adjustable during encryption to keep 
geometric and topological validation. Based on the encrypting matrix, a feature can be encrypted 
adaptively to guarantee the validity of the part model containing the encrypted features. 
(3) Encryption algorithm for parts – The encrypted features are encoded one by one. The process 
will follow the creation order of features to ensure the validity of the part for assembling after the 
encryption of the dependent features. 
The details of the algorithms are explained in the following sub-sections. 
3.1 Classification algorithm for assembly features, dependent features and encrypted features 
The classification of assembly features, dependent features and features for encryption is one of the 
key issues in the encryption process of an assembly model. Several definitions are given below. 
Definition 1: Assembly Feature (AF). The features are used for assembling between two parts in an 
assembly model. 
Definition 2: Dependent Feature (DF). The features that should be maintained to support the 
maintenance of the topological entities used for assembling during the encrypting of parts for an assembly 
model (including the AFs).  
Definition 3: Encrypted Feature (EF). The features that should be encrypted during the encryption 
process of an assembly model. 
To classify DFs and EFs of a part, AFs should be recognized first. In order to facilitate the process, an 
Assembly Relationship Graph (ARG) is defined to represent the assembly relationships between the parts 
of an assembly model. 
Definition 4: Assembly Relationship Graph (ARG).  It is a graph to show the structure and assembly 
constraints of an assembly. N(t, id) denotes a node of the ARG, where t is the type of  the node (assembly 
 model or part model) and id is the name of the node; S(N(assembly, id1), N(t, id2)) is a directed edge from 
N(t, id2) to N(assembly, id1) to denote an assembly relationship between N(assembly, id1) and N(t, id2); 
C(N(t, id1), N(t, id2),Tp1, Tp2) is a undirected edge between N(t, id1), N(t, id2) to denotes an assembly 
constraint where the constraint is conducted by the topological entities Tp1 and Tp2. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the left part - a main sub-assembly of a machine is named saddle, and the 
right part is the ARG of the saddle. The saddle is made up of a part (N(part, saddle_top)) and a sub-
assembly(N(assembly, saddle_base)), and the saddle_base contains four parts (N(part, 
saddle_handle),N(part, saddle_body), N(part, indexing), N(part, indexing_cover)). The purple un-
directed edge shows the assembly constraints. 
 
 
Figure 3: The ARG of the saddle. 
Based on ARG, AFs can be recognized using the following Algorithm AF_recognition( )(pseudo code): 
 AF_recognition(Assembly, Part) 
1. Assembly is an assembly 
2. Part is a part in the Assembly 
3. Initialize a set for assembly features: AF{} 
4. Create the ARG of the Assembly; 
5. Search the ARG and store all the topological entities of the assembly constraints related to the Part 
into a set:  A_constraints{ } 
6. Add the features of the Part which are related to the topological entities in the A_constraints{ } 
into AF{ } 
7. Return (AF{}); 
 
Based on the algorithm, AFs of all the parts in the saddle are recognized as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: AFs recognized from all the parts in the saddle. 
 To keep AFs un-encrypted is not sufficient to maintain the topological entities used for assembling. 
The deformation of an AF’s parent features will also lead to the changes of the topological entities used 
for assembling. As such, except AFs, AFs’ parent features, i.e., DFs, should be identified for encryption. 
In order to recognize DFs, a definition of Feature Dependent Graph (FDG) is built up as following to 
represent the structure of a part. 
Definition 5: Feature Dependent Graph (FDG). It is a graph to represent the structure of a part. N(id, 
order)is a node to denote a feature of the part, id denotes the id of the feature, order denotes the creation 
order of the feature where the order of the first feature is 0. E(N(id1, order1), N(id2, order2)) is a directed 
edge from N(id2, order2) (the child feature) to N(id1, order1) (the parent feature) to describe the dependent 
relationship.  
Figure 5 illustrates the FDG of each part in the saddle. 
 
 
a) The FDG of Indexing_cover, Indexing, Saddle_top and Saddle_handle 
  
b) The FDG of Saddle_body 
Figure 5: The FDG of each part in the saddle. 
Based on the FDG and AFs recognized via the classification algorithm, DFs can be recognized 
according to the following algorithm DF_recognition( ) (pseudo code). 
DF_recognition(Part, Assembly) 
1. Part is a part 
2. Assembly is an assembly and be re-numbered 
 3. AF{ }=AF_recognition(Assembly, Part) // AF{ } is the recognized AF set 
4. Create the FDG of the Part; 
5. Initialize a DF set: DF{ }; 
6. Add all the AFs into the DF{}; 
7. Add all the parent features of AFs into DF{}; 
8. Return (DF{}); 
 
 
Figure 6: Recognized DFs of the Saddle_body. 
 As shown in Figure 6, it is the FDG of the saddle_body part in the saddle, The red features (Extrude_3, 
Extrude_12, Exturde_13, Extrude_14) are AFs. Based on the classification algorithm of DFs, except AFs, 
the blue features are also identified as DFs. 
The identified DFs need to be maintained in the encrypting of parts, and all the remaining features are 
EFs. As shown in Figure 6, all the white features are EFs. 
3.2Encryption algorithm for features 
Assemblies are composed of a grope of part models, and features are the basic elements of part models 
and determine the shape and parameters of part models, as thus, encryption algorithms for features will 
be essential for the encryption approach for assembly models. The detail encryption algorithm for features 
are described below. 
The features in CAD systems can be classified as the following five types: 
 A primary feature is sketch based, and its shape is decided by its constructive sketches; 
 A dependent feature depends on primary features, such as chamfers, fillets, corners, etc.; 
 A complex feature is a group of features arranged by a certain pattern or mirror operation; 
 A combined feature is the combination of two or more features, such as countersunk holes, etc.; 
 An auxiliary feature is used as the reference for building upon other features, such as axis, plane, etc.  
Based on the above analysis, the shapes of the dependent features, complex features and combined 
features in a part are finally determined by the related primary features, and the auxiliary feature will not 
influence the shape and volume of the part. As thus, the shapes of all the features in a part are determined 
by the sketches of primary features, and the encryption of the sketches can achieve the encryption of the 
features then the part. The shape of the sketch is controlled by its vertices pij (controlling points) which 
can be expressed as a nm-dimensional matrix as the following Representation (1): 
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Where the value of m is decided by the dimension of the sketch (m=2 if 2-dimension otherwise 3 for 
3-dimension). 
 The encryption of the sketch can be conducted by an encryption transformation matrix (denoted as A), 
represented as the following Representation (2): 
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Where |A|≠0 to ensure that the encryption is reversible (decryption). 
The encryption of a sketch can be formularized as Representation (3): 
                                                                     'S S A                         (3) 
In addition to the sketch elements, a sketch contains a group of constraints which are auxiliary for 
sketch creation and contain rich design knowledge and experiences, the constraints would not influence 
the shape of the sketch but restrict the change of the sketch. Therefore, in order to support the encryption 
of the sketch, its constraints should be retrieved and stored separately first. Hence, three parts would be 
generated after the encryption of a sketch, encrypted sketch, key and constraint file which are stored as 
an XML file. Applying the encryption of sketches to a feature, an encrypted feature, an XML file 
containing an encrypting matrix and the constraints information of all the related original sketches are 
generated. As illustrated in Figure 7, the left part shows an original part, its sketch and sketch matrix, and 
the right shows the encrypting result. 
Figure 7: An example of sketch encryption 
 In order to improve the user friendliness, security and validity of encrypted features and models, the 
encryption transformation matrix (denoted as A) will be further enhanced from three aspects: 
parameterization, randomicity and self-adaptability. 
The encryption degree of a model would be parametrically controllable to guarantee geometrical 
validity, as thus, to make the A in the above Representation (2) to be parameterized. Representation (2) 
can be re-written as Representation (4): 
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Z and D can be further specialized to Z' and D' as the Representations (5): 
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The sketch S can be transformed based on the matrix Z as the Representation (6). Obviously, Z based 
transformation is a size scaling. 
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Similarly, the sketch S can be transformed based on the matrix Das Representation (7). Comparably, 
D based transformation changes the coordinates inconsistently that is a deformation transformation. 
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Based on the above analysis, the encrypting matrix A can be changed to A' as Representation (8). 
                                                                     ' ' 'A Z D                         (8) 
 It can conclude that, the encrypting matrix A’ is controlled by the parameters of γ and β and A’ based 
encryption is size scaling and deformation mixed transformation whose transforming scale is controlled 
by the parameters γ and β. Figure 8 shows a sample of A’ based encryption. On the top of Figure 8, a part 
and its feature tree, sketch, feature types and sketch matrix are given. On the bottom of Figure 8, it can be 
found that, it is size scaling based on the parameter γ and deformation transformation based on the 
parameter β, and the A’ based encryption is the mix transformation of size scaling and deformation. 
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Figure 8: A sample ofA’ based encryption. 
 In order to improve the randomness of A’ to improve the security of the encryption and maintain the 
parameterization of A’ to support the self-adaptivity of the encryption, the elements of A’ should be 
random within a small range, and A’ can be re-written to be A’’ as Representation (9). 
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(9) 
Based on A’’, the encryption is self-adaptive, owing to the A’’ is approaching to identity matrix based 
on the increasing of n. As thus the encrypted feature is approaching to the original feature. The above 
conclusion can be proved below.  
Definitions: 
Let F denote a feature, and F’ be the encrypted feature from F by applying A’’ 
Let S denote a sketch and SϵF, and P denote a vertex of S and P is (p1, p2, …pm) 
Let S’ denote the encrypted result of S based on A’’ 
Let P’ denote the encrypted result of P based on A’’ 
Let Encryption Distance ED=Distance(P, P’) be the distance between vertex P and vertex P’ 
Let”→” stand for approaching 
 
Step1:Prove [∀ P∈F, if(P’→P) then F’→F ] 
∵∀ S∈F, if(S’→S) then F’→F 
∵∀ P∈S, if(P’→P) then S’→S 
∴∀ P∈F, if(P’→P) then F’→F 
 
Step2:Prove [if(n→+∞) then P’→P ] 
Assumption：n2>n1, An1’’denotes n in A’’ is given the value n1, An2’’denotes n in A’’ is given the 
value n2; 
∵ P’1=P∙ An1’’ 
 ∴ ED2(P, P’1)=Distance(P, P’1)= 1
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∴ ED2(P, P’2)=Distance(P, P’2)= 2
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∵ 0<𝜇<1 and n2>n1 
∴ ED2(P, P’2)- ED2(P, P’1)= 2 1
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∴ P’2 is closer to P than P’1 
∴ if(n→+∞) then P’→P 
 
Step3:Prove [if(n=+∞) then P’=P ] 
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∴ P’=P∙A’’=P 
Conclusion: With an increased n, A’’ will approach to an identity matrix, and the encrypted feature 
will also approach to its original feature. 
 
A’’ based encryption algorithm for features is given as follows (pseudo code). 
Feature_encryption (P, f, γ, β,μ ) 
1. P is a model; 
2. f is the feature needed to be encrypted; 
3. Generate the A’’ based on the γ, β and μ 
4. Generate all the sketch_matrices of f:S_set{ } ; 
 5. While (S_set{}≠NULL) 
6. { 
7.    Get a sketch_matrix from Snm_set{}: s; 
8.   Encrypt the s based on the A’’ 
9.   If P is invalid  
10.    { Decrypt the s;  
11.      Adjust the A’’ by n++; 
12.      Goto 8; 
13.     } 
14.    } 
15. Return (A’’); 
Due to the A’’ based encryption is self-adaptive, after the encryption, the encrypted part is valid. 
Moreover, the parameter of γ controls the size scale, the parameter of β controls the deformation scale and 
the parameter of μ controls the efficiency of encryption, their values can be decided according to the user’s 
requirement. 
An example of feature encryption is given in Figure 9, and it can be found that, the encrypted part is 
invalid until the value of n increases to 5. 
 
n=1 n=5
γ=1, β=0.8, μ=0.9
Encryption
 
Figure 9: An example of feature encryption. 
 3.3Encryption algorithm for parts 
After the classification of features, EFs of a part should be encrypted. The feature encryption will 
conduct according to the creation order of features based on the FDG. The encryption of part is detailed 
as the following algorithm of Part_encryption( )(pseudo code). 
Part_encryption ( Part, Assembly, γ, β, μ ) 
1. Part is the original part; 
2. Assembly is the original assembly; 
3. Create the FDG of the Part 
4. Get the feature number from the FDG: F_n; 
5. DF{ }=DF_recognition(Part, Assembly) 
6. Initiate a XML file: Key_file; 
7. i=1; 
8. while (i<F_n) 
9. { 
10. Encrypt the ith features in Part : f_i ;  
11. Retrieve the constraints information of the f_i and record it into the Key_file; 
12. A=Feature_encryption(Part, f_i, γ, β, μ); 
13. Record A into the Key_file; 
14. i++ 
15. } 
 
As illustrated in Figure 10, all the parts of the saddle are encrypted based on the encryption algorithm 
for parts. 
  
Figure 10: Encryption of each part in the saddle. 
3.4 Assembly of encrypted parts 
Based on the algorithm of Part_encryption( ), the encryption of an assembly can be conducted by the 
encryption of its parts. To illustrate encryption for an assembly model, as illustrated in Figure 11, it is the 
final encrypting result of the saddle.  
 
Figure 11: Encrypting of the saddle. 
The encrypted assembly and encrypting key (XML files) will be stored separately. If a collaborator 
requests an assembly for sharing, the encrypted assembly can be authorized by the assembly owner. 
According to the requirement of the collaborator, the shared parts of the assembly can be designated by 
the assembly owner. Then, the shared parts will be decrypted based on the related keys, and finally, the 
decrypted and encrypted parts of the assembly will be assembled to a secure assembly sent to the 
collaborator. 
 3.5 Discussion 
Algorithm security analysis: Firstly, According to the value ranges of α and β, the space of encryption 
keys have 
2310 m  possibility at least, so that the crack based on the testing of possible encryption keys is 
therefore computationally difficult. Secondly, if somebody would try to decipher an encrypted CAD 
model by testing all the possible encryption keys, he or she may get a group of valid cracking results. It 
is impossible to tell which one is correct. Thirdly, as the encryption transformation matrix is not a periodic 
matrix, the existing main attack methods for matrix based encryption are invalid (such as the chosen 
cipher-text attack, plain-text attack and so on). 
Time complexity analysis: The time complexity of the algorithms are analyzed below: 
 Encryption algorithm of a feature, Feature_encryption( ): T(n)=O(n2) 
 Encryption algorithm of part models, Part_encryption( ): T(n)=O(n3) 
 Encryption algorithm of assemblies, Assembly of encrypted parts: T(n)= O(n4) 
It is can be conclude that, the encryption algorithm of assemblies has low time consumption. 
Validity analysis: Firstly, the content based encryption is adopted in this paper and the assembly 
features are maintained, which can be used for the assembling after the encryption. As thus, after the 
encryption, the assemblies are still valid. Because all the parts in the assemblies are still there, the 
external dimensions is feasible. Secondly, the encrypted features and parts can be designated by the model 
owner flexibly, so that, the encryption of assemblies is flexibly. Finally, based on the encryption of related 
features, all the confidential information is hidden. Above all, the encryption algorithm of assemblies 
presented in this paper can satisfy the collaboration requirements on secure sharing of assemblies. 
4. Case Study 
A real example (provided by the SolidWorks 2012) is given below to validate the approach. In this case, 
the machine is collaboratively designed by three sites. The task of Site 1 is motor head, the task of Site 2 
is machine bed, and the task of the Site 3 is machine base. The Site 1 requests the two assemblies from 
the other two sites for assembly analysis, as shown in Figure 12. The machine bed is a key assembly 
which needs to be protected during sharing and interoperation, and the machine base is public. 
  
Figure 12: Collaboratively design of the machine. 
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Figure 13: Encryption of the machine bed. 
 Step1: Encryption of the machine bed 
The machine bed needs to be encrypted for security. The encryption processes of saddle part and bed 
part have been described in detail in Sections 3 and 4 (as shown in Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, 
Figure 10 and Figure 11). Figure 13 shows that the machine bed is made up of two sub-assemblies (saddle 
and chute) and a part (bed), the grey models are the original models and the green models are encrypted 
models. In the encrypted models, the models shows the maintained topological entities (red faces) used 
for assembling. The final encrypted machine bed is totally different from the original machine bed, the 
information of parts and structure has been protected effectively. 
Site 2
Site 1
Decryption of 
shared parts
Site 3
Figure 14: Secure sharing of the machine bed. 
Step2: Secure sharing of the machine bed 
 When the Site 1requests the machine bed and the machine base for assembly analysis, the bed is 
authorized by the assembly owner for the sharing of machine bed. As shown in Figure 14, the encrypted 
machine bed is authorized to a secure assembly. In the secure assembly, the saddle and chute are still 
encrypted, but the bed is decrypted and it can be interoperated flexibly. Moreover, the structure of the 
machine and the information of the saddle and chute are protected effectively. 
5. Conclusions 
In order to minimize the secure risk for an assembly model for collaboration, an innovative encryption 
approach is presented in this paper. In the approach, to satisfy assembly constraints, assembly relations 
and related features should be maintained after the encryption of the parts in the assembly model. The 
approach consists of three algorithms. First, a classification algorithm has been developed to identify 
assembly features, dependent features for the assembly and features for encryption. Second, an encryption 
algorithm for features in apart based on an encryption transformation matrix has been designed. Based on 
the above algorithms, an encryption algorithm for parts has been devised to encrypt features in parts and 
ensure that the encrypted parts are still assembliable. The research innovations include:  
(1) The approach is innovative to encrypt features in an assembly model. The feature based encryption 
mechanism will be easily integrated into the main-stream CAD systems and to meet various users’ needs 
for selected feature encryption during collaboration. The validity of an assembly model, the geometry and 
structure of the assembly model after encryption are maintained. As such, the encryption mechanism will 
improve users’ interoperability during collaboration; 
(2) The approach provides an innovative parametric mechanism for encrypting features and parts in an 
assembly model. This parametrically controllable mechanism will facilitate users for encryption by 
adjusting position and size parameters defined in the approach, so as to greatly enhance users’ friendliness 
and flexibility during collaboration. 
As the outer dimension is always very important in the product design, it is hope that, after the 
encryption, the outer dimension is still maintained.  How to maintain the outer dimension after the 
encryption is a key problem of future research. 
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